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STUDENT COMMENTS
NON-JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION-
REPRISAL IN NEED OF REFORM
In recent years there has been a considerable upsurge in credit
sales involving consumer items pledged as collateral for their purchase
price.' With this increase in credit purchasing there have been pro-
portionate increases in the number of credit buyers defaulting under
conditional sales contracts, and in the use by conditional sellers of
their default remedies. One such remedy is the right to retake condi-
tionally sold goods without resort to legal process if it can be accom-
plished peaceably. This remedy, often styled non-judicial repossession,
has been invoked by conditional sellers with such frequency that in a
recent decision a Florida court took judicial notice of its prevalence.'
Supporters of non-judicial repossession argue that it is both
economical and necessary. They contend that a "self-help" system of
repossession, which does not involve costly legal fees, is far more eco-
nomical than formal legal process.' From the stand-point of necessity,
non-judicial repossession is justified as being essential to the protection
of the creditor's collateral. Personal property, it has been pointed out,
can easily be lost, sold or stolen before the creditor can obtain relief
from the courts. 4
Abuse of non-judicial repossession, on the other hand, often
produces considerable hardship for the debtor. David Caplovitz, in his
work on the plight of the low-income consumer, recounts that his
investigations disclosed numerous cases of excesses and abuses per-
petrated by repossessors while attempting to reclaim goods' The
abuses related included physical violence to the debtor or his family
1 See Financial and Business Statistics, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. A 54 (Feb. 1970).
2 Florida Indus. Say. Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
3 Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 47 Minn.
L. Rev. 205, 211 (1962).
4 Goodman v. Schulman, 144 Misc. 512, 514-15, 258 N.Y.S. 681, 683-84 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1932). Blackstone indicates in his Commentaries that this rationale was also used to
justify the practice of non-judicial repossession under the English common law:
The reason for this is obvious; since it may frequently happen that the owner
may have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his goods may be
afterwards conveyed away or destroyed ... if he had, no speedier remedy than
the ordinary process of law.
3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *4.
5 D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More 161-67 (1963). While the incidents related by
Mr. Caplovitz generally occurred in the course of judicial repossessions, the potential for
abuse is even greater in non-judicial repossession where the creditor proceeds at his own
instance without the presumptive safeguard of having a peace officer present. The pro-
cedures used in non-judicial repossession have also been specifically criticized. Felsenfeld,
Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 535, 556 (1967).
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and conversion of other goods not covered by the contract!' Moreover,
at least one merchant interviewed admitted to invoking the remedy on
occasion not to regain his equity, but to punish a customer.? Exposure
to such abuses inevitably undermines the poor man's confidence in the
legal system. Consequently, former United States Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach has observed:
[T] he poor man sees the law only as something that garnishes
his salary, that repossesses his refrigerator. . .. The poor
man is cut off from this society—and from the protection of
its laws. We make of him ... a functional outlaw.'
This comment will examine non-judicial repossession in light of
the techniques often employed, the bases for its utilization, and existing
remedies for abuses in the course of non-judicial repossession. In ad-
dition, the purported need for this remedy will be critically analyzed
with particular attention to the possibilities of either abolishing non-
judicial repossession or of modifying the principles currently governing
its use.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NON- JUDICIAL. REPOSSESSION
The common law generally recognized the right of a conditional
seller to retake collateral without recourse to the courts upon default
by the buyer.° Examples of this principle may be found in American
cases dating from at least as early as 1809, when the New York
Supreme Court, in a case involving possessory rights in a tract of real
property, stated: "In a case bearing analogy to the present, of per-
sonal property, the right of recaption exists, with the caution that it
not be exercised riotously, or by a breach of the peace . . . ." 1° The
New York Court of Common Pleas invoked this dictum 60 years later
in upholding the right of a conditional seller to peaceably recapture a
sewing machine without formal judicial process." In so doing, the
court noted that the applicable rule "permits a party to resort to every
possible means for the recaption of his property short of a breach of
the peace.""
0
 D. Caplovitz, supra note 5.
7
 Id. at 21. The threat of repossession is also often invoked by sellers for its in
terrorem effect in forcing debtors to pay. Boyd, Representing Consumers—The Uniform
Commercial Code and Beyond, 9 Ariz. L. Rev. 372, 397 (1968).
8
 W. Crook & R. Thomas, Warriors for the Poor 150-51 (1969).
9
 Annot., 36 A.L.R. 853 (1925).
10
 Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. Cas. 150, 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). Compare the lan-
guage in 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *4:
Reception or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the
party injured. This happens, when anyone hath deprived another of his property
in goods or chattels personal . . . in which case the owner of the goods ... may
lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them; so it be not
in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.
II Kinny v. Planer, 9 N.Y.C.P. 131, 134 (1869).
12 Id .
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The rule permitting non-judicial repossession was consistently
recognized during the late 19th and early 20th centuries," and by
1919 had achieved general acceptance when the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, in promulgating the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act (U.C.S.A.), authorized peaceable non-judicial
repossession on the occasion of the debtor's default. 14 The Uniform
Commercial Code, which has superceded the U.C.S.A., also expressly
authorizes non-judicial repossession. Section 9-503 of the Code pro-
vides: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured
party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace or may proceed by action . . . ."" This provision
"follows the provisions of the earlier uniform legislation in allowing
the secured party in most cases to take possession without the issuance
of judicial process." 16 Thus, the Code rule as to non-judicial reposses-
sion is similar to that of the U.C.S.A. except that the U.C.S.A. was
more specific as to the circumstances which constituted a default.
II. DEFAULT AS A PREREQUISITE FOR NON-JUDICIAL
REPOSSESSION
Although most of the secured party's rights under the Code arise
upon a default by the debtor, the term "default" is not specifically
defined in the Code. As a result, courts and commentators have gener-
ally declared that the circumstances which constitute a default are a
matter for contractual agreement between the parties. 17 The Code
supports this view since it expressly allows the parties by agreement
to "determine the standards by which fulfillment of these rights and
duties is to be measured.'" 8
It is generally accepted that a default in the absence of a specific
agreement occurs only upon a failure by the debtor to pay or perform
13 For cases allowing recaption see Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1331 (1943).
14 U.C.S.A, § 16 provides!
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any sum due under
the contract, or in the performance of any other condition which the contract
requires him to perform in order to obtain the property in the goods, or in the
performance of any promise the breach of which is by the contract expressly
made a ground for the retaking of the goods, the seller may retake possession
thereof. Unless the goods can be retaken without breach of the peace, they shall
be retaken by legal process; but nothing herein shall be construed to authorize
a violation of the criminal law.
18 U.C.C. § 9-503. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1962
Official Text.
18 U.C.C. § 9-503, Comment.
17 Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 818, 168 S.E.2d 827, 830
(1969) ; Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 691, 696, 155
S.E.2d 651, 654 (1967) ; 1 CCH Secured Trans. Guide g 250, at 3,206 (1969) ; Hogan,
supra note 3, at 209; Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 86 Banking L.J. 965, 968
(1969); Squillante, Commercial Code Review, 74 Com. L.J. 17 (1969).
18 U.C.C. 9-501(3).
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his obligations under law or contract.' 9 The U.C,S.A. expressly condi-
tioned the right to repossess upon a default in a payment or in the
performance of any other condition of the contract which the buyer
was required to perform before he could obtain property in the goods. 2°
The specified circumstances giving rise to a default closely paralleled
the standard definitions of a breach of contract21 and suggested the
conclusion that under the U.C.S.A. breach of an important contract
term constituted a default sufficient to invoke the right of repossession,
whether or not the contract so provided.22 This conclusion is supported
by the holding in Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co.,23 which involved an
administrator's action against a financer of the decedent's mobile home
business. One count of the complaint alleged trespass and conversion
arising out of the defendant financer's repossession of a number of
house trailers. The defendant contended that although the decedent
was not behind in his payments, his death constituted a default within
the meaning of the contracts, thus giving rise to a right of repossession.
In reversing a summary judgment in favor of the financer, the Georgia
Court of Appeals rejected this contention, commenting:
While death, among many other contingencies, may be
included as a basis for default, it is not automatically so in-
cluded. Absent a specific inclusion in the document, we give
to the abstract term default as here utilized only its generally
accepted meaning of failing to perform or pay.' (Emphasis
added.)
Questions arise concerning the degree of default required in
order to justify invocation of the non-judicial repossession remedy,
and whether a minor or mere technical default would suffice for this
purpose. It has been suggested that in dealing with this type of situa-
tion a court might well apply a "materiality" test to default, particu-
larly in the case of consumer goods.25
 An analogy can be made between
the concepts of "total breach" of the contract and default, since a total
breach, like a default, usually terminates the obligations of the non-
breaching party to carry on under the contract. 26
 Professor Corbin has
stated that "[a] total breach of contract is a non-performance of duty
that is so material and important as to justify the injured party in
regarding the whole transaction as at an end." 27
 (Emphasis added.)
19 Squillante, supra note 17, at 17. Nylen v. Geeraert, 246 Md. 4, 10, 226 A.2d 878,
880 (1967).
20 U.C.S.A. § 16.
21 Restatement of Contracts §§ 312, 314 (1932) ; 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 943
(1951).
22 2A G. Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, in Uniform Laws Annotated,
§ 102 (1924).
23 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969).
24
 Id. at 818, 168 S.E.2d at 830.
25
 2 W. Willier & F. Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code If 92.46 (1969).
26 4 A. Corbin, supra note 21, § 946.
27 Id.
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This theory is applicable to the concept of default since the effect of
a repossession executed under section 9-503 is to terminate the con-
tract. The right to repossess and sell the collateral implicitly allows an
acceleration of the balance due on the contract, and for all practical
purposes the transaction between seller and buyer is summarily ter-
minated.' In the absence of specific contract terms delineating the
circumstances under which the seller may repossess, it would seem
that the total breach theory should provide minimum standards for
determining whether repossession, judicial or non-judicial, is war-
ranted."
Where the parties have specifically included in the contract what
constitutes a default for purposes of repossession, there should be some
limitation with respect to the degree of default justifying actual repos-
session. In this connection it has been suggested that the obligation of
good faith set forth in Section 1-203 of the Code might be used to
test the secured party's motives in utilizing non-judicial repossession."
In assessing good faith and in evaluating the necessity for invoking
non-judicial repossession in a given instance, the basic purpose for the
remedy should be kept clearly in mind. The remedy is intended for
use by a seller who reasonably deems his security to be threatened.
In view of this underlying purpose it would seem that a slight or mere
technical violation of even a specific default condition of a contract
28 This generalization must be qualified in terms of U.C.C. § 9-506, which affords
the debtor a right to redeem the collateral "by tendering fulfillment of all obligations
secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party
in retaking." Presumably, a consumer purchasing an item on credit would be unable to
tender the whole balance due required for redemption under § 9-506; hence, a repossession
does, for all practical purposes, "terminate" the transaction.
20 The standard proposed by Corbin is similar to that incorporated into § 16 of the
U.C.S.A. Bogert's commentary to that section notes:
The Uniform Act takes the position that there should not be an implication
of a right to retake unless there has been a breach of an important term of the
contract. .. • That the buyer has failed to do some trivial act, which he under-
took to do by the terms of the conditional sale contract should not impliedly
give cause for retaking.
G. Bogert, supra note 22, § 102.
38 W. Willier & F. Hart, supra note 25. The results of a recent study of automobile
repossession practices in Connecticut point up the potential for abuse in the default area.
The study notes that the same autos are often repossessed and resold several times at
high profits over a relatively short period of time and concludes:
Our data tend to show motivations for quick defaults and repossessions on the
part of automobile dealers and their financers, with special application to used
cars presumably purchased on credit by similar low-middle-income groups. The
employment of full-time repossessors by financers and some of the larger volume
dealers bespeaks anticipation of defaults that will occasion repossession, and in
sufficient numbers. There are enough defaults to make economically worthwhile
the salary of the night-type who accomplishes the actual physical retaking of the
car. One cannot, in this context, dismiss the matter as the derelictions of a few
"deadbeats."
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale,
22 Stan. L. Rev. 20, 42 (1969).
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should not give rise to the right of repossession unless, concomitantly,
the circumstances would lead the seller reasonably to conclude that
his security was threatened. For example, a common provision in
form conditional sales contracts declares that the buyer shall be in
default if he removes the collateral from the state without the written
permission of the secured party.' Technically the buyer would be in
default if, for example, the collateral were an automobile and the
buyer drove into another state on his vacation. Permitting the secured
party to repossess the vehicle on the basis of such a default would
be manifestly absurd, for even assuming that the debtor remained in
another state without such written consent, so long as he continued
to make timely payments on his obligations the secured party could
hardly conclude that his security was threatened.
Once a default has occurred, the right to non-judicial repossession
under Section 9-503 of the Code arises and, pursuant to the provisions
of that section, recapture of the collateral may then be accomplished
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace. Since avoidance of breach of the peace is a fundamental require-
ment in implementing the remedy, examination of the connotation of
this term is required.
III. THE BREACH OF THE PEACE LIMITATION ON
NON-JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION METHODS
While a secured party's right to invoke non-judicial repossession
is conditioned upon his ability to do so without a breach of the peace,
that concept, like the concept of default, is not defined in the Code.'
The courts, in attempting to supply a workable definition for purposes
of determining when the seller may proceed to repossess non-judicially,
have disagreed as to whether a simple trespass or the use of fraud or
deception in order to effect repossession, absent actual violence, consti-
tute breaches of the peace. This disagreement is perhaps due to the fact
that some courts have declined to adopt the traditional concept
founded in criminal Iaw that a breach of the peace must entail violence.
A. Breach of the Peace as Requiring Violence
.	 or the Direct Threat of Violence.
The classic definition of breach of the peace was formulated by
the criminal courts generally as follows:
A breach of the peace is an offense well known to the com-
mon law. It is a disturbance of public order by an act of
violence, or by any act likely to produce violence, or which,
by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and
quiet of the community.33
•
at E.g., H. Bailey, Modern Uniform Commercial Code Forms 15 (1963).
83 Hogan, supra note 3.
xi People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 429, 64 N.E. 175, 177 (1902). Accord, People v.
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This early emphasis upon violence or the threat of violence has exerted
considerable influence over the definitions of breach of the peace em-
ployed in some repossession cases. A Tennessee court of appeals, in
Harris Truck &Trailer Sales v. Foote,' recently promulgated such a
definition of breach of the peace in a fact situation involving the re-
possession of a trailer tractor. The purchaser of the tractor under a
conditional sales contract had sued in conversion when the tractor
was surreptitiously repossessed at night from a parking lot. The evi-
dence showed that no other persons were around when the tractor was
repossessed. The trial judge charged the jury that a breach of peace
did not necessarily include an act of violence or the threat of violence,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the charge was erroneous, since by its interpre-
tation of Section 9-503 of the Code breach of the peace "must involve
some violence, or at least threat of violence."'
A similar definition of breach of the peace was employed by the
New York Supreme Court in Cherno v. Bank of Babylon.' The case
involved an action in conversion against a bank holding a security
agreement. The bank's agents had repossessed the collateral by using
a master key to gain entrance to the assignor's premises. The plaintiff
contended that this clandestine use of an unauthorized key constituted
a breach of the peace under section 9-503. In rejecting this contention,
the court noted that the security agreement in question authorized
entry by the secured party for purposes of repossession, and that:
[T] here was nothing in what they did that disturbed public
order by any act of violence, caused consternation or alarm,
or disturbed the peace and quiet of the community. Nor was
the use of a key to open the door an act likely to produce
violence; indeed, it produced from the landlord only (I) a
call for the police and (2) a request to the bank employees
that they leave the key when they were through. Under the
circumstances that existed during the times the bank's em-
ployees entered the premises, there was as a matter of law no
breach of the peace."
Although the focus in Cherno was upon violence or the threat of
violence as a criterion for determining whether a breach of the peace
had occurred, there is other authority which suggests that an unau-
thorized entry into the debtor's premises poses a sufficient threat of
violence as to fall within the prohibition against breaches of the peace.
Halliday, 337 App. Div. 302, 303, 261 N.Y.S. 342, 344 (1932) ; 2 R. Anderson, Wharton's
Criminal Law and Procedure § 802 (1957).
84 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).
35 Id. at 573.
36 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
37 Id. at 281-82, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
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In Girard v. Anderson," the plaintiff had purchased a piano from the
defendant under a time-payment contract which, in the event of a
breach, permitted the defendant to repossess the piano wherever it
might be found. The plaintiff defaulted on the payments and, in his
absence, the defendant repossessed the piano from his home. The
plaintiff alleged that the house was locked at the time and that by
breaking in to reclaim the piano the defendant's employees committed
a trespass. The defendant maintained that his employees entered the
home through an unlocked door and that therefore a trespass action
could not be maintained. The appellate court, however, stated that the
entry did constitute a breaking and entering." The court then con-
sidered whether such a breaking and entering, despite the contract
provision permitting repossession, constituted a trespass. In so doing
the court discussed a number of cases dealing with breach of the peace
in the form of unauthorized entry into the debtor's home, and in par-
ticular a Pennsylvania case" which declined to permit such entry in
view of its "tendency to excite a breach of the peace and invite violent
resistance.' The Pennsylvania court reasoned that if a contract
provision were so construed as to permit the seller to break into the
premises while the buyer was absent, the same construction would
allow him to do so while the buyer was at home. This result, the court
concluded, "would be promotive of disorder and frequent breaches of
the peace."42
 In addition to these considerations, the Girard court was
concerned with the constitutional implications of permitting reposses-
sors unrestricted latitude in entering homes. Following its consideration
of previous cases involving private dwellings, the court summarized
them as follows:
The views expressed in the foregoing cases recognize our
state and national constitutional provisions protecting the
sacredness of the home . . . .
Under the rule as announced in this line of cases, the
seller had only the right to take possession with the buyer's
consent and not against his consent. If the consent was im-
properly withheld, the courts were open to him. The posses-
sion under authority of a contract may be exercised without
recourse to the courts, only when the retaking can be done
peaceably. If it becomes necessary to resort to force, then
the courts of the state are open for the protection of his
rights. An agreement permitting a family's home to be broken
open and entered for the purpose of forcibly taking posses-
38 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934).
39 Id. at 145, 257 N.W. at 401.
40 Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195 (1916).
41 Id. at 200.
42 Id. at 201.
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sion of property therein is contrary to good public policy and
void to that extent.'
Thus, implicit in the Girard opinion is the theory that an unauthorized
entry into the debtor's home, constituting as it does an illegal breaking,
and posing a danger of exciting violent response, is a sufficient breach
of the peace to preclude repossession without judicial process. Nor
does the court's use of the conditional language "for the purpose of
forcibly taking possession of property," contradict this view of the
case. It must be recalled that the debtor was not home in Girard when
the piano was repossessed. Accordingly, the reference to force reflects
only the court's characterization of the unauthorized entry employed
by the defendant's agents.
Under definitions of breach of the peace requiring violence or the
threat of violence, courts have generally sanctioned repossession in
the absence of the debtor when the collateral was not taken from within
the debtor's home. Automobile repossessions are most frequently ac-
complished in this manner," and it has often been held that the re-
possession of an automobile parked on a public street is not a breach
of the peace." Repossession from the debtor's driveway" or front
lawn,47 absent some showing of violence or willful wrongdoing, has
also been held not to constitute a breach of the peace.
Under violence-oriented definitions of breach of the peace, some
jurisdictions have also permitted a certain amount of mechanical
alteration of the collateral by repossessors. In this connection it has
been held that use of the technique known as "wiring around the
43 219 Iowa at 148, 257 N.W. at 402-03. Accord, Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust
Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962), which held that a contract provision similar
to that in Girard was contrary to public policy and therefore void. While the court in
Girard was specifically concerned with the issue of trespass to realty, if the rationale
employed by the court is to have any real significance, the Girard decision must also be
interpreted as supporting the proposition that repossession effected through an unlawful
entry into the debtor's home constitutes a breach of the peace sufficient to render a non-
judicial repossession unlawful. In Cherno the court acknowledged that its holding was
squarely opposed to the holding in Girard, but made no attempt to distinguish Girard:
Except for the Girard case, the other cases are distinguishable on their facts,
and while the Girard case is contrary to the decision now being reached, the
instant decision is supported by Malone v. Darr (178 Okla. 443) holding as a
matter of law that no breach of the peace was committed when an automobile
dealer repossessed a car by taking the keys out of it.
54 Misc. 2d at 282, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 120. What parallel the court perceived between the
repossession of a car by removing the keys and gaining entry to a building by un-
authorized means is somewhat obscure. The court could have distinguished Girard on the
fact that in Girard a home was entered, while in Cherno it appears to have been a busi-
ness premises.
44 See Shuchman, supra note 30, at 28.
45 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Shucy, 243 Ky. 74, 47 S.W.2d 968 (1932);
Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 1 So. 2d 776 (1941) ; General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 183 Okla, 547, 83 P.2d 539 (1938).
46 Dearman v. Williams, 235 Miss. 360, 109 So. 2d 316 (1959) ; Pioneer Fin. & Thrift
Corp. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
47 Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962).
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ignition" employed in starting vehicles for which no keys are avail-
able does not constitute a breach of the peace when used in order to
effect a repossession." Use of a coathanger to unlock a car door was
found to be a permissible repossession technique in one case," and the
unscrewing and removal of a small panel from the side of a truck in
order to unlock the door was held to be "entirely peaceable."" Minor
damage to the collateral in the course of repossession also has been
rejected as grounds for claiming an unlawful repossession."
The legality of repossessions in most jurisdictions continues to be
determined on the basis of whether there has been some violence and,
hence, a breach of the peace. As a result, in most jurisdictions virtually
any techniques short of precipitating an actual altercation with the
debtor are permissible. Indeed, one commentator has observed:
Between some secured parties and debtors, the act of
taking possession has become almost a game. Stealth, master
keys and tricksterism have become the tools of professional
"re-possessors." Apparently, any method is tolerable so long
as resistance is not met which results in an altercation.52
An illustration of the latitude afforded professional repossessors oper-
ating under this standard appears in a recent article by Professor
William Hogan:
There are other ways of getting the goods back if you
want to repossess. My favorite one involves New York cab
drivers. Imagine going up to a cab driver and saying, "I
would like to repossess your cab."You no doubt know that
there are professional repossessors, who have highly devel-
oped skills. They get another cab and follow the target cab
down an avenue and at each stoplight they bump into the
target cab. They keep repeating this procedure at several
stoplights. Finally out jumps the debtor-driver of the first
cab, fists ready. Meanwhile, a repossessor is jumping out of
the pursuing cab into the target cab, and both cabs drive
away. The Code says you may repossess the collateral with-
out legal action if you do not threaten a breach of the peace.
I am sure that on that street corner a breach of the peace
would shortly occur, but the collateral is now gone."
While it would seem that repeatedly ramming another taxicab should
qualify as a breach of the peace, and it is apparent that a physical
altercation is averted only if the repossessors are agile enough to out-
Kroeger v. Ogsden, 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967), in which the court held that there
would not be a breach of the peace if this technique was used to repossess an airplane.
49 Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962).
50 Martin v. Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 274, 114 So. 2d 669, 671 (1959).
51 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 183 Okla. 547, 83 P2d 539 (1938).
52 W. Willier & F. Hart, supra note 25.
53 Hogan, supra note 17, at 969.
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maneuver the infuriated cab driver, this anecdote nevertheless illus-
trates the type of repossessory conduct sanctioned by the definitions
of breach of the peace employed in many jurisdictions."
The preceding cases and examples presumably provide only a
meager glimpse of both the types of techniques employed in non-
judicial repossession and the extent of their application. Non-judicial
repossession, it must be recalled, originates, by definition, out of
court. However, most repossessions involve low-income buyers' who
generally lack both the sophistication to discern actionable abuses
and the resources to seek redress in the event such abuses take place.
Accordingly, so few repossessions are contested that existing appellate
court decisions probably do not provide a true reflection of non-judicial
repossession as it is practiced on a day-to-day basis. At best, the cases
have attempted to set forth general guidelines for distinguishing per-
missible repossession techniques from those which are prohibited be-
cause they are breaches of the peace. It is submitted that the decisions
concerned only with actual violence or the threat of violence fail to
provide equitable guidelines in the non-judicial repossession area. Cases
involving breach of the peace which sanction such questionable tech-
niques as the use of master keys to enter private premises, wiring
around ignitions, nocturnal sorties onto private property, incursions
into the debtor's yard and damage to the collateral itself seem clearly
to be beyond peaceable activity. Moreover, judicial sanction of these
techniques raises obvious questions concerning the ultimate limits of
permissible repossessory conduct. Recognizing these problems, a num-
ber of courts have taken a somewhat broader view of breach of the
peace and have declined to sanction conduct similar to that exempli-
fied in some of the cases just discussed.
B. Non-Violent Conduct as a Breach of the Peace
Some jurisdictions have recognized the potential for violence in-
herent in certain repossession methods and have treated the use of
such techniques as breaches of the peace, even when no actual violence
or overt threat of violence is involved. Illustrative of this approach
is Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer," where a repossessing agent
arrived at the debtor's home and began attaching a tow bar to her car.
54 For two cases illustrating violence erupting in the course of repossession of auto-
mobiles, see Jonaitis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1967),
where the debtor was denied recovery in assault and battery after a brawl with 3
repossessors, on the theory that repossessors were "withdrawing" and were defending
themselves from a possible attack by the debtor; and Westerman v. Oregon Auto. Credit
Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P.2d 435 (1942), where the debtor was denied recovery in simple
trespass after an altercation in which repossessors broke a window in the car, attempted
to deflate the tires, removed the spark-plug wires and finally retreated when the debtor
threatened them with a brick.
55
 P. McCracken, J. Mao & C. Fricke, Consumer Instalment Credit and Public
Policy 135 (1965).
56 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961).
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The debtor immediately called her attorney who informed her that the
repossessor could not take the car without judicial process. She and
her husband then told the repossessor that they objected to his taking
the car, but be disregarded these objections and proceeded to tow the
car to a nearby service station. The debtor and her husband followed
the car to the service station where they again demanded that the
repossessor unhook the automobile. He disregarded these demands also
and finally drove away with the automobile still in tow.
The debtor conceded that she was delinquent in the payments and
that Manhattan Credit Company had the right to repossess the auto-
mobile in a proper manner. She contended, however, that the reposses-
sion was improper. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, awarded the
debtor $200 in damages for conversion. On appeal the Supreme Court
of Arkansas affirmed, and stated that the applicable rule of law was
that "there is a conversion if force or threats of force are used to
secure possession of the automobile."" In finding that a "threat of
force" had occurred, the court relied upon Kensinger Acceptance Corp.
v. Davis," which involved the repossession of a truck which the debtor
had conveniently parked in a finance company's parking lot while he
was inside discussing his account. When he returned to the truck he
found that employees of the finance company had removed the keys
and he was informed that the truck had been repossessed. When the
debtor produced a spare key and attempted to start the truck, the
manager of the finance company mounted the running board and told
him, "he wasn't going to leave in the truck."" The Kensinger court
held that a jury could find that this statement constituted a threat of
violence because it was not shown how the manager could have pre-
vented the debtor from leaving in the truck except through violence."
Accordingly, the debtor's judgment in conversion was sustained. The
court in Manhattan Credit pointed out that, much like the situation
in Kensinger, Manhattan Credit Company's repossessor Could not have
been prevented from towing away the debtor's car without resort to
force." Moreover, the court noted, the underlying policy in permitting
only peaceable non-judicial repossession was to discourage conduct
which would create a risk of violence as well. In this connection the
court stated:
The purpose of the rule against the use of threats of
violence in these kinds of cases appears to be that the con-
ditional vendors may retake possession without legal proced-
ure where and when they can do so peaceably and without
incurring the risk of invoking violence." (Emphasis added.)
67 Id. at 978, 341 S.W.2d at 766.
68 223 Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d 792 (1954)
68 Id. at 945, 269 S.W.2d at 793.
ea Id. at 945, 269 S.W.2d at 793-94.
01 232 Ark. at 980, 341 S.W.2d at 767.
62 Id. Other courts, presumably on the theory of avoiding a risk of violence, have
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In some jurisdictions the increased risk of a violent response in
situations involving repossession from the debtor's home has given
rise to much stricter standards in such circumstances. This considera-
tion emerged in the Girard case where the court, in addition to dis-
cussing the constitutional problems inherent in repossessions from
private homes, noted that unauthorized entries into the debtor's home
had an intrinsic tendency to excite a breach of the peace and invite
violent resistance.'
In Kirkwood v. Hickman," a repossession case involving the re-
moval of a stove from the debtor's home, the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi also expressed its concern over this type of non-judicial
repossession. In Kirkwood the repossessors found at the debtor's home
only a daughter-in-law who had not given them permission to take the
stove; she requested that the repossessors wait until the debtor re-
turned home. Ignoring this request, they entered the house without
permission and removed the stove. In condemning this conduct the
court quoted from an early Louisiana case" which warned that cases
involving invasion of the home "constituted a gross outrage upon the
rights and feelings of plaintiff, as a citizen and as a man, for which
courts of justice must either grant redress or sanction the personal
exaction of satisfaction by violence."" Recognizing the emotional
aspect of repossession from the debtor's home, and the corresponding
increased risk of violent resistance by the debtor, the Kirkwood
court set forth very strict standards to be applied in such reposses-
sions:
Where the repossession occurs in a private residence of the
conditional vendee, the retaking must occur with the knowl-
edge of and without objection by the vendee. Otherwise the
conditional seller has an adequate remedy at law to retake
the property. The important factors of the sanctity of a
private home from invasion by others, and the right of
privacy require, we think, a different rule as to the right of
repossession from that applied in those cases not involving a
private residence.'
expressly condemned the use of "stealth or fraud," in addition to "breach of the peace,"
in regaining possession. See, e.g., Malone v. Darr, 178 Okla. 443, 446, 62 P.2d 1254, 1257
(1936). In McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 667, 114 So. 2d 60, 62
(1927), the court stated that "fraud, deception, trick or artifice" are not allowed in re-
gaining possession. In Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 872, 1 So. 2d 776,
778 (1941), the court commented that repossession may only take place "when circum-
stances are such as to create no apprehension of any violence."
03
 Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 147, 257 N.W. 400, 402 (1934). See pp. 442-43
supra.
64 223 Miss. 372, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955).
65 Van Wren v. Flynn,.34 La. Ann. *1158 (1882).
66 223 Miss. at 381-82, 78 So. 2d at 355.
07 Id. at 384-85, 78 So. 2d at 356.
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C. Suggested Modifications of the Breach of the Peace Concept
The cases in the preceding section applied a realistic definition
of breach of the peace considering the specific social evils the con-
cept is designed to prevent. Definitions purporting to ban only overt
threats and actual physical combat between the debtor and repossessor
encourage a highly dangerous form of tactical "brinkmanship" in
which breach of the peace becomes a standard applied after the fact
to determine whether the repossessor's conduct remained within the
bounds of legal propriety, rather than a standard by which prospective
conduct may be governed. The net result - is the encouragement of
experimentation in techniques of repossession which may directly
affect public tranquility. The fostering of such an unstable atmosphere
seems particularly unhealthy. Moreover, an examination of the cases
illustrating the questionable techniques which non-judicial repossession
often encourages, and analysis of current commercial practices, viewed
in light of the general availability of judicial repossession, raise con-
siderable doubt as to whether non-judicial repossession affords suf-
ficient positive advantages to offset its obvious negative aspects and to
justify its continued existence." Even assuming that non-judicial
repossession is essential to the protection of creditors, additional
safeguards could nevertheless be devised which, while adequately
protecting the creditor's legitimate interests, would simultaneously
afford at least consumer buyers uniform protection against unwar-
ranted abuses.
One such safeguard would be afforded by a practical Code defini-
tion of breach of the peace, which the Uniform Commercial Code
does not now provide. This definition should specifically include as
breaches of the peace the use of fraud, deception, stealth, theft,
artifice, unauthorized entry upon the debtor's premises, or any other
conduct posing a reasonable risk of violent reaction. The strict standard
set forth in Kirkwood, prohibiting non-judicial repossession from a
private home unless the debtor is present and consents, should be
included as a specific limitation on the exercise of the remedy. In addi-
tion, a provision could be included to the effect that in any action for
wrongful repossession brought by a consumer against a reposses-
sing seller or financer, evidence of a non-judicial repossession would
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the repossession was wrong-
ful. An amendment to section 9-503 would doubtless be the most
effective and uniform method of accomplishing these changes."
These suggestions for reform in the area of non-judicial re-
possession, while balancing the essential interests of both the secured
party and the debtor, would also encourage secured parties contemplat-
ing repossession to reflect seriously upon both the wisdom and necessity
68 See pp. 457-61 infra.
Such provisions would in no way prejudice the rights of reputable sellers, judi-
ciously invoking non-judicial repossession out of a reasonable belief that their collateral
is threatened. Only precipitate use of the remedy would be discouraged.
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of proceeding non-judicially. In addition, the adoption of such pro-
visions would, by placing the burden of proof as to the propriety of
his conduct on the repossessing party, buttress the remedies available
to the debtor for redress of wrongful repossession.
IV. DEBTOR REMEDIES IN REPOSSESSION CASES
The remedies available to the debtor may be categorized under
four general headings: (1) when repossession involves a breach of the
peace or conduct tending to excite a breach of the peace, (2) when
misrepresentation and fraud are used as repossessory techniques, (3)
when collateral torts are committed by a repossessor, and (4) punitive
damages for wrongful repossession.
A. Remedies When a Breach of the Peace
Occurs During Repossession
1. Trespass
Trespass, both to realty and to chattels, has often afforded debtors
some recovery in repossession cases involving either a breach of the
peace or conduct tending to excite a breach of the peace." While tres-
pass to realty has often given rise to recovery in cases involving a
wrongful invasion of the debtor's home," it is unclear from the general
language appearing in some of the cases whether the recovery was
for trespass to chattels, realty, or both. 72 At least one case, Singer
7° In Westerman v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 225, 122 P.2d 435, 439
(1942), the court stated that "plaintiff may sue for tresspass to the person, he may sue for
wrongful invasion of real property, or he may sue for trespass de bonis asportatis to
chattels."
Courts have allowed recovery on various trespass theories. See, e,g., Evers-Jordan
Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939), where remittitur was
ordered reducing punitive damages to $250 where the value of the goods removed
from the plaintiff's home was only $8; Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1958), where actual damages were recovered but unspecified in the
report and punitive damages were denied; Robinson v. Hook, 1 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct.
App. 1941), where $265 was recovered of which $65 was the debtor's equity in the
furniture repossessed and $200 was compensation for "embarrassment and humiliation";
Kirkwood v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955), where $380 in actual and
punitive damages was held not excessive; Cecil Baber Elec. Co. v. Greer, 183 Okla. 541,
83 P.2d 598 (1938), where damages were recovered but were unspecified in the report.
For additional examples see Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 358 (1965).
71 See Kirkwood v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955). In Van Wren v.
Flynn, 34 La. Ann. *1158, *1160 (1882), the court stated:
ITIhe unlawful invasion of the pauper's hovel and the abstraction of its scanty
possessions, is an injury identical in character and magnitude with the like entry
of a palace and the despoiling it of its gorgeous apparel.
See also Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958).
72 See, e.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939),
which involved an action supposedly in "trespass to realty" but in which the court
appears to include the value of the goods repossessed in computing damages; Kirkwood
v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955), where the court allowed recovery for
"wrongful trespass and repossession of a stove" without clearly differentiating the counts.
In Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934), the plaintiff alleged a con-
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Sewing Mach. Co. v. Hayes, 73 expressly rejected trespass to chattels
as a theory of recovery when it appeared that the debtor was in de-
fault in his payments. In Singer the debtor sought recovery on theories
of both trespass to land and trespass to chattels when repossessors
broke into her home and removed a sewing machine. Because the
debtor was in default in the payments, the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals sustained a demurrer to the count in trespass to chattels. In
so doing, the court noted that upon default by the debtor the seller
once again became the rightful owner and was entitled to immediate
possession. The court concluded that the debtor could not maintain
an action in trespass to chattels against "the rightful owner," even
if the retaking involved a breach of the peace, and that an action for
trespass to the debtor's home would lie only if the repossessor com-
mitted a breach of the peace 74
The simplicity of this result has a certain logical appeal. However,
if there is a breach of the peace, the result is of questionable validity.
Trespass to chattels may be committed either by dispossessing another
of the chattel or by using or intermeddling with a chattel in the posses-
sion of another. 75 Wrongful dispossession is, therefore, always a tres-
pass to chattels and subjects the actor to liability for at least nominal
damages." Since under Section 9-503 of the Code repossession without
judicial process may take place only "if this can be done without a
breach of the peace," a repossession involving a breach of the peace is
a wrongful dispossession and an action for trespass to chattels will lie. 77
Moreover, it would seem that the language of section 9-503 implicitly
creates not only a right on the part of the debtor not to be forcibly
dispossessed without judicial process, but also a concomitant obliga-
tion on the part of the secured party to refrain from proceeding non-
judicially if the use of force will be necessary. In this connection,
Section 1-106(2) of the Code states: "Any right or obligation declared
by this Act is enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it
specifies a different and limited effect." Thus, it is the implicit policy of
the Code to encourage recognition of the debtor's right to enforce the
provisions of section 9-503 through affirmative action. An action in
trespass to chattels is clearly one method of enforcement available to
the debtor.
version of a piano and money, and wrongful breaking and entering of a house. The court
stated that the allegations were broad enough to include damages for both trespass and
conversion and it was immaterial what the cause of action was called. Id. at 145, 257
N.W. at 401.
73 22 Ala. App. 250, 114 So. 420 (1927).
74 Id. at 251, 114 So. at 421. In Westerman v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Ore.
216, 226, 122 P.2d 435, 439 (1942), the court stated that "[i]n an action for simple trespass
[to chattels] in the taking of a chattel, the immediate right to possession on the part of
the taker is a complete defense."
76 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1965).
76 Id. § 222, comment a.
77 Squillante, supra note 17, at 18, states that "[a] trespass will always lie no matter
who has the right to possession where there is a breach of the peace."
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2. Conversion
Recovery by the debtor in conversion poses similar but more dif-
ficult problems. While Section 9-503 of the Code places an obligation
upon the secured party to refrain from proceeding without judicial
process if a breach of the peace will occur, the same section clearly
shifts the right to possess and (implicitly) to control the collateral to
the secured party once the debtor has defaulted. Accordingly, there is
some question as to whether, even assuming a violent repossession by
the secured party, the debtor would be able to maintain an action in
conversion. Recovery in conversion is based upon interference with
one's right to control the chattel, 78 and therefore, extends beyond the
scope of trespass to chattels." This is of considerable importance to
aggrieved debtors since, from a practical standpoint, actions founded
in trespass often yield recoveries so meager as to render the time and
expense of litigation hardly worthwhile. 8° If recovery were only allowed
on a trespass to chattels theory, and if the repossession involved a
breach of the peace but no invasion of the debtor's home or conduct
warranting punitive damages, recovery would be minimal and the pro-
hibition against breach of the peace in section 9-503 would be but an
unenforceable "policy."
Permitting recovery in conversion, however, would provide a
mechanism for enforcement, since the debtor would be able to recover
the fair market value of the chattel at the time of the taking, plus
interest and demonstrable consequential damages." In most wrongful
repossession cases the wrongdoer himself has an interest in the property
taken. Accordingly, the dispossessed debtor's damages must be reduced
by the amount of that interest." If the debtor could only recover on a
trespass to chattels theory, the seller's deficiency judgment would ex-
ceed by a substantial margin any recovery the debtor might hope to
obtain. On the other hand, if recovery in conversion were permitted,
the debtor's position in the final accounting would be considerably im-
proved. Thus, debtors who were victims of unlawful repossessory
techniques would acquire a direct pecuniary interest in enforcing the
provisions of section 9-503, and the knowledge that debtors had this
enforcement device at their disposal would discourage repossessors
from employing such techniques.
An early case permitting recovery in conversion for improper
78 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965).
78
 Dean Prosser has termed trespass to chattels the "little brother of conversion."
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 14 (3d ed. 1964).
8o See the representative recoveries at note 70 supra.
81 C. McCormick, The Law of Damages § 123 (1935).
82 Id.; see 2 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages § 497(e) (9th ed. 1920):
If ... the converter is one who himself holds the remaining interest in the chat-
tel, as in case of the wrongful retaking and resale of an automobile by the seller
under a conditional sale agreement, then the plaintiff recovers only the value of
his limited interest.
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repossession was Ben Cooper Motor Co. v. Amey,83 in which a condi-
tional seller repossessed an automobile while the buyer was present and
objecting. The lower court awarded damages in conversion and the
seller appealed. In affirming the finding of conversion, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma defined conversion as "any distinct act of dominion
wrongfully asserted over another's personal property or inconsistent
with his rights." 84 The court then stated that although the debtor was
in default in the payments and the conditional seller had the right to
retake the car, he had no right to take possession "by force or threats
of violence and without consent of the mortgagor."" The court ob-
served:
A man is not required in defending his property to use
physical force to resist the taking thereof by another. If he
tells the other not to take the property and the other person
in the face of the instruction proceeds to take it, that may
be conversion.86
The rationale of Ben Cooper seems to be that the right to possession
is intimately connected with the overriding requirement that the
repossession be accomplished peaceably. This rationale emerges most
clearly in the court's statement that "[t]he law will not permit a
mortgagor [sic, mortgagee?] to threaten a breach of the peace, or
commit a breach of the peace, and then to justify his conduct by trial
of the right of property."" In effect the court said that the debtor
retains the right to exercise dominion over the property until such
time as he is rightfully dispossessed. By its very nature a forcible
or threatening dispossession is a "wrongfully asserted" act of dominion
"inconsistent with [the debtor's] rights," and hence, a conversion.
In Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wiener,88 the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa, proceeding on a conversion theory, affirmed a lower court award
of $3,500 in actual and punitive damages to an elderly woman whose
furniture was repossessed under a void writ of process. The reposses-
sors had dumped the contents of her furniture onto the floor and scat-
tered clothing, dishes, books and linens about the house. In addition
they damaged various items of furniture, and refused the infirmed
debtor's request that one of four mattresses repossessed be left for
her. The unfortunate woman was later found sick, lying on some quilts
on the floor, with her home in a shambles. The repossessing financer
maintained that, assuming the invalidity of the writ of process under
which the furniture had been repossessed, it was nonetheless privileged
by the terms of its chattel mortgage89
 to repossess the furniture with-
83 143 Okla. 75, 287 P. 1017 (1930).
84
 Id. at 76, 287 P. at 1018.
85 Id. at 15, 287 P. at 1018.
86 Id. at 76, 287 P. at 1018.
87 Id. at 75-76, 287 P. at 1018.
88 405 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1965).
89
 An issue occasionally arises in cases involving chattel mortgages as to whether the
452
NON-JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION
out judicial process. It was also argued that the debtor had consented
to the repossession. The debtor testified, however, that she had only
consented because a constable had been present and had told her that
it was his duty to take the furniture. Since the constable had no
authority to act under the invalid writ, the court reasoned that a
jury question was presented as to whether the debtor had been in-
timidated. 9° Pointing out that repossession without process cannot be
accomplished by oppressive conduct and intimidation," the court
approved the lower court's instruction on conversion."
B. Remedies When Repossession Is Accompanied by Fraud
Various forms of fraud are occasionally used by professional
repossessors seeking to induce the debtor to surrender the collateral
voluntarily. If this tactic is successfully utilized a fraudulent repos-
session involves little risk of a breach of the peace. However, the use
of fraud can create other problems for the repossessor, as illustrated by
the case of Rhodes-Carrol Furniture Co. v. Webb, 93
 which resulted
in a recovery by the debtor for trespass. In Rhodes-Carrol, the plain-
tiff alleged that one of the agents seeking to repossess certain furniture
from her house represented to her that be was a "detective." On the
strength of this misrepresentation the plaintiff consented to allowing
the men to take the furniture. The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld
a lower court award of damages in trespass to the plaintiff, stating:
[T]he jury could reasonably infer from the proof that repos-
session was thus obtained against the consent of the wife,
though without any act of resistance on her part. Possession
thus obtained may nevertheless constitute a trespass, a wrong-
ful taking . . . . 94
mortgagee upon default acquires title to the collateral or merely an actionable lien,
that is, whether the jurisdiction in question subscribes to the lien theory or the title
theory of mortgages. For example, the court in Beneficial Finance dismissed the de-
fendant's authorities from title theory jurisdictions, pointing out that the lien theory
obtained in Oklahoma. 405 P.2d at 694. In a conversion action by the debtor, the right
to exercise dominion over or to control the property is the basic issue, and location of
title could conceivably determine whether or not the debtor has a right to recover. Given
the rationale of Ben Cooper, however, that the secured party's right to dominion may
only be exercised peaceably, the location of legal title to the property should have no
bearing upon the debtor's right to maintain an action in conversion.
The Code has rejected the title theory and instead focuses upon the respective
"rights, obligations and remedies" of parties to a secured transaction. U.C.C. § 9-202 &
Comment. Accordingly, in determining the Iegal status of the parties under § 9-503, tech-
nical concepts of title and ownership should yield to an equitable comparison of the
rights of the parties as qualified by their respective obligations.
9° 405 P.2d at 696.
91 Id. at 695.
92
 Id. at 697. Other cases have also allowed recovery on a conversion theory. See,
e.g., Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 223 Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d 792 (1954) ; Man-
hattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961).
93 230 Ala. 251, 160 So. 247 (1935).
94 Id. at 252, 160 So. at 248.
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Since unlawful force is required for a breach of the peace in Alabama,"
the court in effect held that fraud constituted constructive force and
therefore a breach of the peace. 9°
Another fraudulent device occasionally employed by repossessors
involves inducing the debtor to surrender the collateral on the strength
of false assurances that his doing so will cancel the remaining debt."
Although one case" has sustained the seller's right to a deficiency
judgment after such a repossession, an earlier case, McCarty-Greene
Motor Co. v. House," denied a deficiency judgment to the seller.
McCarty-Greene involved a dispute surrounding the return of an
automobile purchased on credit from a garage. The debtors testified
that they had purchased the car jointly and had fallen behind in the
payments. They claimed that they took the car back to the seller and
told him that because they were behind in the payments they had
decided to let him take the car back in full payment of what was owed
on the car. 10° Whether the seller had acceded to this arrangement was
unclear. The debtors claimed that the seller feigned acceptance of this
proposal and instructed them to drive the car to the back of his garage.
Then, once the garage manager had gained possession of the keys,
95 Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Hayes, 22 Ala. App. 250, 251, 114 So. 420, 421 (1927).
99 For a recent case permitting recovery in conversion when a sheriff was procured
to assist the defendant in repossessing a Caterpillar tractor, see Stone Mach. Co. v. Kess-
ler, 463 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970), where the court held that the presence of a
sheriff acting colore officii constituted "constructive force" amounting to a breach of the
peace. In Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okla. 131, 233 P. 460 (1925), the court allowed re-
covery where the repossessor procured a deputy sheriff who implied he was seizing the
property under court order when, in fact, he had no such order. Contra, Besner V. Smith,
178 A.2d 924 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962), where the court denied recovery for wrongful
repossession, shock, mental suffering, and loss of consortium, absent some showing of
an actual physical assault upon the plaintiff wife, when a repossessor exhibited a "badge"
and stated that he was a "marshal]."
97 Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 86 Banking L.J. 965, 968-69 (1969).
Rs Barnes v. Reliable Tractor Co., 117 Ga. App. 777, 161 S.E.2d 918 (1968). In so
holding, the Barnes court did not discuss another Georgia case, Moody v. Nides Fin. Co.,
115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967), decided during the previous year. Moody denied
a deficiency judgment where a representative of the finance company obtained the keys
to an automobile pledged as security by stating that he wished to test-drive the car and
subsequently announced that the company had its "money's worth" in the car and was
going to keep it. While the court in Moody stated that a jury could reasonably find
accord and satisfaction on these facts, the decision seems to have turned more on the fact
that the debtor was not notified when the deficiency sale of the automobile was held.
This, the court indicated, violated U.C.C. § 9-504(3) and prejudiced the debtor's right
to redeem the car or to make arrangements for someone else to buy it at a price most
advantageous to the debtor. Accordingly, the court held that a deficiency judgment was
precluded. For a later Georgia case emphasizing this aspect of Moody, see Braswell v.
American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 700-01, 161 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1968). Moody
might also be distinguished from Barnes on the fact that in Barnes the debtor surrendered
the collateral in reliance upon the repossessor's representation that the debt would be
cancelled, while in Moody the alleged representation was made only after the debtor's
sister-in-law had surrendered the keys.
99 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927).
100 Id. at 667, 114 So. at 61.
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the debtors claimed that the seller refused to release them from liability
for past-due payments. The seller sued to recover the past-due pay-
ments and, on a plea of accord and satisfaction, the jury found for
the debtors. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the finding on
the theory that the debtors' voluntary surrender of the collateral was
sufficient consideration to bind the seller to an accord and satisfaction
stating:
[T .] he consideration necessary to support a release—or more
properly, perhaps, an accord and satisfaction—is found in the
benefit, or possibility of benefit, accruing to plaintiff by the
regained possession and ownership of the automobile, of
which benefit it must be held to have judged for itself at the
time of the transaction involved."'
C. Remedies for Collateral Torts in the Course of Repossession
If in attempting to execute non-judicial repossession the repos-
sessor commits some tortious act against the person or property of the
debtor or a third party, the cases are in substantial agreement that he
is liable for such conduct. Thus, if the repossessor intentionally in-
flicts physical injury upon the debtor or another person, he will be
liable in assault and battery,'" or if he injures other property belong-
ing to the debtor, he will be held accountable for the damages caused
by his tortious acts. 10" Occasionally a debtor has recovered in con-
version when the defendant "repossessed" items of personal property
not subject to his security interest. If the collateral is unlawfully
repossessed, any personal property of the debtor contained in it or
otherwise appropriated in the course of the wrongful repossession is
converted when it is taken. However, if the collateral is lawfully re-
possessed, such personal property of the debtor would not be converted
until the debtor unsuccessfully demanded its return. This situation
often arises when an automobile containing items of personal property
belonging to the debtor is repossessed. In a recent case, Southern
Indus. Say. Bank v. Greene,'" a Florida court of appeals upheld a
verdict for the plaintiff in an action for conversion of certain items of
personal property which were allegedly hidden in the plaintiff's car
when the car was peacefully repossessed by the defendant. The plain-
tiff claimed that certain valuables and cash which she intended to use
101 Id. at 667-68, 114 So. at 62.
102
 For a discussion of pre-Code cases illustrating recovery in such circumstances, see
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 358, § 6 [al (1965).
103 See Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969), in
which the court held that recovery should be allowed where repossessors allegedly dam-
aged water, sewer and electric lines and destroyed an "add-a-room" in reclaiming mobile
homes from the debtor's property. In Whisenhunt the court held that "while defendant,
through its agents, had the right to peacefully enter the premises and obtain its property,
the defendant would be responsible for any tortious acts committed during the repos-
session." Id. at 819, 168 S.E.2d at 831.
104
 224 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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as collateral for a loan were hidden in the trunk of the auto when it
was taken. The appellate court held that recovery in conversion was
permissible on the theory that upon repossessing the automobile the
defendant bank became a "constructive bailee" of any items of per-
sonal property it contained. The court declared that, "once having
chosen this [non-judicial repossession] remedy, the instituting party
subjects itself to any liability due to negligence arising in the course of
enforcement.'
Repossessors may also be held liable if the debtor sustains an
additional loss resulting from the repossessor's failure to exercise
proper care. In Rewire Corp. v. Vaughn,'" the repossessors gained
entry to the debtor's house by breaking a window. The debtor alleged
that they departed leaving the house unlocked and that a thief had
later entered and removed certain tools belonging to the debtor. The
court held that recovery against the repossessor for the lost tools was
permissible since breaking the window and leaving it in its broken con-
dition could be found to be a proximate cause of the theft of the
tools.' 07 Recovery in such circumstances is based upon a negligence
theory under which the repossessors are held liable for conduct or
omissions which would foreseeably result in harm to the debtor. There-
fore, such recovery is possible whether or not the repossession itself
entailed a breach of the peace.
D. Punitive Damages
In many of the preceding cases the debtors sought punitive
damages against the repossessor for abuses in the course of reposses-
sion. For example, in Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wiener,'" the debtor
whose home had been reduced to a shambles in the course of *reposses-
sion was awarded $1,500 in punitive damages against the offenders.'"
Also, in Kirkwood v. Hickman, 11 ° where the repossessors entered the
debtor's home without permission over the implicit objections of the
debtor's daughter-in-law, an award of $380 in punitive damages was
approved by the appellate court.
109 Id. at 418. For another recent case allowing recovery for personal property re-
possessed with the collateral and later lost, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Petrillo, 253 Md. 669, 253 A.2d 736 (1969). Earlier cases approving recovery in con-
version when other goods of the debtor were taken accidentally in the course of
repossessing the collateral include: Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 257 N.C. 639,
127 S.E.2d 225 (1962), where the court approved of recovery for tools contained in an
automobile lawfully repossessed; Associates Discount Corp. v. Parlier, 98 Ga. App. 740,
107 S.E.2d 238 (1958), where the court allowed recovery for a diamond ring which
was in a repossessed automobile; A. B. Lewis Co. v. Robinson, 339 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960), where the court allowed recovery for a coupon book worth $20 which
was in a repossessed automobile.
106 142 A.2d 148 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958).
101 Id. at 150. See also Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195 (1916).
108 405 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1965).
109 Id. at 694-95.
110 223 Miss. 372, 375, 78 So. 2d 351, 352 (1955).
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While most states do allow punitive or exemplary damages in
appropriate circumstances," it is generally recognized that something
more than the mere commission of a tort is required to justify punitive
damages."2 Usually the imposition of punitive damages is contingent
upoll a showing of aggravating or outrageous circumstances such as
spiteful, malicious, fraudulent or intrinsically evil conduct on the part
of the defendant." Accordingly, despite the success of some debtors
in obtaining punitive damages, a number of appellate courts have
either stricken or substantially reduced such awards in repossession
cases.'" Reduction or reversal of punitive damages is generally
predicated upon the court's belief that the defendant's conduct was not
sufficiently malicious to warrant such measures."' However, since the
actual damages in wrongful repossession cases are often minimal com-
pared to the humiliation suffered by the debtor, a better rule would be
to allow jury awards of reasonable punitive damages. Such a rule
would encourage the abused debtor to seek redress in the courts, and
would discourage the unscrupulous from engaging in undesireable
repossessory practices. Commenting upon the salutary effect of punitive
damages, Dean Prosser has noted that "it is precisely in the cases
of nominal damages that the policy of providing an incentive for
plaintiffs to bring petty outrages into court comes into play.""° If
the courts are to provide truly equal protection for all, imposition of
punitive damages in wrongful repossession cases should be allowed.
E. Evaluation of Debtor Remedies
A survey of the existing remedies for wrongful repossession and
collateral abuses seems to suggest that an aggrieved debtor has several
potential avenues of redress when a repossessor engages in tortious
conduct. However, for most debtors who are likely to suffer reposses-
sion, the legal remedies and the practical realities do not coincide.
It has been suggested that the debtor's position could be improved by
reducing his burden of proof in affirmative suits for wrongful reposses-
sion, and by providing additional incentives for debtor action in the
111 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 2 (3d ed. 1964). A few states, however, have
rejected punitive damages entirely. Id. at n.60.
112 Id. See also Kirkwood v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 385, 78 So.2d 351, 356 (1955).
113 W. Prosser, supra note 111, § 2.
114 See, e.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939),
where the verdict which included punitive damages was reduced to 8250; General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Petrillo, 253 Md. 669, 253 A.2d 736 (1969), in which the appellate
court reversed a jury award of 85,000 in punitive damages; Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler,
463 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970), in which the appellate court' reversed an award
of $12,000 in punitive damages.
115 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Petrillo, 253 Md. 669, 676, 253
A.2d 736, 740-41 (1969) ; see Stone. Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 463 P.2d 651, 656 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1970), in which the court found that there was not a "particularly aggravated dis-
regard for the rights of [the plaintiff)" and that punitive damages would therefore be
denied.
116 W. Prosser, supra note 111, § 2.
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form of punitive damages and possible recovery in conversion. These
suggestions, however, proceed upon the assumption that the typical
dispossessed debtor is readily disposed to the protection of his rights
through affirmative legal action. Such a presupposition is distinctly
middle-class and, perhaps, inordinately naive. In a recently published
article dealing with automobile repossession practices,'" Professor
Philip Shuchman concluded that any reforms in that area should be
predicated upon a "self-executing" legal model for, as he points out:
If the consumer is given rights and remedies that must be
asserted in a court—any court within the framework of the
present legal system—we might just as well do nothing. For
the promises will be of no meaning to those who need
help ...."8
One self-executing approach suggested by Professor Shuchman
was the elimination of debt actions and deficiency claims arising out
of the installment sale of automobiles." 8 Perhaps a similar self-
executing approach would provide the solution to abuses in the area
of non-judicial repossession as well. Many of the abuses in non-judicial
repossession are traceable to lack of supervision by a peace officer
when the repossession takes place. Thus, an ideal self-executing solu-
tion to such abuses would be the elimination of non-judicial reposses-
sion by requiring that all repossessions be effected by means of valid
legal process executed by a duly authorized officer.
Apologists for non-judicial repossession continually assert that
retention of the remedy is essential to the maintenance of a viable
system of credit. The arguments against its abolition are generally
similar to the following observations of the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi:
From the standpoint of mere social preference, it may
well be thought that unless the surrender of possession is
entirely agreeable to the mortgagor, it would be better to
resort to legal process, but this entails costs, often consider-
able, and sometimes a delay which in itself under some cir-
cumstances might be dangerous to the security.'"
In weighing the merits of such contentions it is helpful to con-
sider briefly the general status of repossession—judicial and non-
117 Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession
and Resale, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 20 (1969).
119 Id. at 53.
119
 Id. at 55. Professor Shuchman's article is concerned primarily with dealer and
financer practices in conducting deficiency sales and not with the practice of repossession
itself.
120 Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 873, 1 So. 2d 776, 778 (1941).
See also Goodman v. Schulman, 144 Misc. 512, 514-15, 258 N.Y.S. 681, 683-84 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1932), where the court declared that without some provision for summary
seizure of chattels pledged as security the credit system "would be imperilled and per-
haps break down."
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judicial—in the light of current commercial needs. A number of studies
and commentators throughout the past 15 years have suggested that
repossession of items other than automobiles is both undesirable and
little-used by creditors."' The consensus of these authorities seems
to be that items such as household goods offer little prospect of
profitable resale, that resort to repossession injures the business good-
will of the creditor and that, when the costs of retaking are con-
sidered, repossession generally results in a loss on the account.'" Thus,
the argument that non-judicial repossession of household goods is
particularly essential for the protection of the security must be viewed
against this countervailing factor. As indicated earlier, non-judicial
repossession of household goods produces the risks of unwarranted
humiliation of the debtor and the possibility of violent reaction incident
to invasion of private homes. These considerations have led one com-
mentator to suggest that "the protection a secured party receives from
the ability to repossess household goods without judicial process is
probably not as important as the avoidance of undue humiliation and
discomfort to the unfortunate family. 7123 It has also been pointed out
that household goods are generally not of the mobile type, and that the
householder who possesses them has little reason to willfully or negli-
gently damage such goods.' 24
Automobiles, however, are said to present a different problem
since they are highly mobile and easily hidden or damaged.'" Thus,
it is claimed, promptness after default is of considerable importance
in repossessing them. The necessity of being able to act quickly to
recapture endangered collateral is frequently cited as a justification
for non-judicial repossession,' 2° and is predicated upon the assumption
that recourse to the courts is inordinately time consuming. However,
this assumption is questionable. Replevin proceedings in most states do
not appear to be unduly complex, and advance notice to the buyer of
impending repossession is generally not required.'" Professor Shuch-
man reports that many automobile sellers and financers who routinely
handle automobile repossessions on a judicial basis have developed
virtual assembly line methods for speedily processing such actions:
The accounts in default are handled in groups with
printed forms leaving only a few blanks to be filled in.
121 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Consumer Instalment
Credit, Pt. I, at 75 (1957) ; P. McCracken, J. Mao & C. Fricke, Consumer Instalment
Credit and Public Policy 122 (1965) ; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 445, 448 (1968).
122 1 Board of Governors, supra note 121, at 75; P. McCracken, J. Mao & C. Fricke,
supra note 121, at 122.
123 Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions,
8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 535, 557 (1967).
124 Id .
125 Id.
124 See p. 458 and note 120 supra.
127 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 247, §§ 7-22 (1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
1-472 to -484 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
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Moreover,, the suit papers are picked up by the sheriff or
other process server in fair piles from lawyers who ususally
do little else for their livelihood and have the entire process
organized in routines that are both aesthetically pleasing and
economically worthwhile 128
Even those financers who do not customarily proceed through
the courts in repossession cases often refer their delinquent accounts
to professional repossession or "repo" agencies. 129 Presumably this
procedure entails some lost time in terms of administrative processing
by the "repo" agency and further delay if the agency has a backlog
of referrals. Thus, the argument that non-judicial repossession affords
the advantage of unparalleled speed is of questionable validity.
Non-judicial repossession has also been traditionally justified on
the basis that proceeding informally reduces the costs of repossession.
Certainly professional repossession agencies charge for their services
and creditors who do their own repossessing often employ full-time
personnel to perform this function.'" In either event the expenses
entailed are properly styled costs of repossession. However, if the
creditor prevails in court, the costs of the action may be placed upon
the debtor, and the Code permits the reasonable costs of repossession,
including legal expenses, to be deducted by the creditor, on a first
priority basis, from the proceeds of any deficiency sale."' Since
debtors ultimately bear the expenses of repossession, they should at
least be afforded basic protection against extra-legal abuses in the
event of default. Elimination of non-judicial repossession would provide
such protection in the most effective way possible—by removing the
source of such abuses.
To be effective, however, non-judicial repossession should not only
be eliminated as a statutory remedy, but should be prohibited as a con-
tractual remedy as well. While it might be argued that such a measure
would infringe upon the consumer's freedom to contract, Professor
Shuchman's response to this assertion appears reasonable:
The consumer's freedom to contract is a lie. The consumer
needs freedom from such flexibility.
This is not to say that laws should protect the consumer
from improvident bargains—although I do not know why
that is so widely considered an improper function for a legal
system—but that the consumer and the social order in which
he lives should be spared the frightful consequences of his
ignorance and inability to bargain. As matters are now, the
legal system has created rights in secured parties that harm
228 Shuchman, supra note 117, at 41.
129 Squillante, Commercial Code Review, 74 Com. L.I. 72 (1969).
180 Shuchman, supra note 117, at 42.
181 U.C.C. 9-504(1) (a).
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many consumers. It would be better to prevent the harm by
curbing these freedoms to contract . . . and cancelling rights
improvidently created for creditors' benefit.'"
CONCLUSION .
In view of the abuses it precipitates and the questionable argu-
ments for its retention, at the very least a reappraisal of the need for non-
judicial repossession is appropriate. In the event that such a reappraisal
reveals grounds for its retention, additional safeguards should be
adopted as minimum standards governing its use. A uniform definition
of breach of the peace, specifically designed for use in the context of
commercial repossession, should be developed. This definition should
specifically preclude as repossession techniques the use of fraud, de-
ception, stealth, theft, artifice, unauthorized entry or any other con-
duct posing a reasonable risk of violent reaction. Repossessions from
private homes should be specifically prohibited unless the debtor is
present and consents. Finally, in any action brought by a consumer-
debtor for wrongful repossession, evidence of a non-judicial reposses-
sion should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the repossession
was wrongful. An amendment to the U.C.C. incorporating the fore-
going provisions would be an expeditious means of attaining these
ends. Victims of abusive repossession practices should also be permitted
to sue in conversion and to collect punitive damages, thereby providing
realistic mechanisms for enforcement of the breach of the peace
limitation on the right to invoke non-judicial repossession. Adoption
of these proposals would in no way prejudice the rights of reputable
sellers, judiciously invoking the remedy out of a reasonable belief
that their collateral is threatened. Their adoption would, however,
discourage the precipitate use of a remedy which, in its current form,
contains great potential for abuse.
F. ANTHONY MOONEY
132
 Shuchman, supra note 117, at 53.
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